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WHAT REMAINS OF PINOCHET'S CHILE? 
September in Chile is normally a month of intense political activity. It is the 
month of the Fiestas Patrias, the days that celebrate, with military parades, 
the founding of the Republic. It is also the month that saw the anniversary of 
the coup that overthrew the Allende government in 1973. Appropriately, in 
1992, the military was involved in two central political episodes in 
September. They were foreshadowed when General Pinochet, making one of 
his famous improvised speeches in the Club de la Union, referred to the army 
as 'a sleeping lion' - a barely disguised threat of trouble with the army if 
human rights trials threatened that institution.1 Then two episodes of 
intelligence surveillance dramatically high-lighted the continuing involvement 
of the military in domestic politics. September also saw the first Cabinet 
reshuffle of the government of President Aylwin, marking the start of the 
campaign for the Presidential elections to be held in December 1994. 
This paper is an interim and provisional assessment of the Aylwin 
government, attempting to trace both the continuities with the previous 
Pinochet government, and the changes that have been introduced. It is 
necessary to emphasise that the Aylwin government is restrained by a 
Constitution which was designed by Pinochet, is very difficult to reform, and 
which, by appointing nine designated Senators effectively denies the Aylwin 
government a majority in the upper house of Congress. So the question of 
what remains of Pinochet's Chile really breaks down into two parts. The first 
is what did the Aylwin government have to accept of necessity? And the 
second is, what did it choose to retain when there were other alternative 
policies? Another, related question concerns the extent to which democracy 
has been consolidated in Chile. Is it really the case, as President Aylwin 
asserted in August 1991, that the transition is now over? 
The economy 
Continuity is most clearly seen in the area of macro - economic policies. The 
Aylwin government has continued the broad lines of the Pinochet economic 
model, and with success. An ECLA report praised the successful 
management of the Chilean economy in 1991, principally by the Finance 
Minister, Alejandro Foxley. 'The Chilean economy registered another year 
of high growth, a slow down of inflation, a fiscal surplus, an upsurge in 
investment and solid external a c c o u n t s . . . . Government expectations for an 
increase in output of more than 7 %, an inflation rate of around 13 % and rises 
in employment and real wages of more than 4% in 1992 are being met.'2 
Indeed, less than 5% of the workforce is unemployed, and this has led to 
shortages of skilled labour in some sectors. On the external front, the current 
account of the balance of payments to September 1992 was better than the 
comparable period in 1991, in spite of a 7% revaluation of the peso. Exports 
grew by 12% in the first three-quarters of 1992, and non-copper exports by 
17%. Net international reserves rose by US $1.5bn in the same period, 
reflecting a large capital inflow to Chile. 
Is this success a legacy of the Pinochet state? Is the new government 
simply administering a prolongation of the miracle? It is, of course, true that 
the new government is broadly following the free market policies of the 
former government. The parties opposed to the Pinochet government realised 
that an essential condition to achieve a pact with the military on any future 
democratic government was a firm commitment to continue with the free 
market economic model. But Chile is hardly alone in this respect. Free 
market policies are being applied almost everywhere, and it is doubtful if any 
Chilean government, given the importance of exports to the economy and the 
need for foreign investment would have any alternative other than to follow, 
broadly at least, such policies. 
It is undeniable that there are positive aspects of the Pinochet legacy -
notably the growth and diversification of the export sector, and the 
development of a new and more dynamic business class, more able to 
compete internationally and less inclined to seek state protection. But 
Pinochet's government left office in 1990 with the economy in a far from 
healthy condition. The short term legacy of that government was increasing 
macro-economic disequilibrium. In a burst of populist expenditures targeted 
at the plebiscite of 1988 and the elections of 1989, real demand rose by an 
unsustainable 22% in the period 1988-89; inflation for the period September 
1989 to January 1990 on an annualised basis rose to 31.5%; and if exports 
rose by 20%, in the same period imports rose by an alarming 46%.3 
The economic growth of 1988-89, therefore, rested on precarious 
foundations. The economy was reaching the limits of its capacity, for growth 
had been based upon using under-utilised capacity. But investment to increase 
capacity was inadequate. The growth of new investment in the economy was 
only 15.4% pa in the 1981-89 period compared with 20.2% pa in the period 
1961-71. Growth between 1988-89 also rested on export prices that were 
abnormally high, and that could not be expected to be maintained. Even the 
prosperous export sector faces future problems of access to markets. Exports 
grew by 20% pa 1975-85 due to relatively easy markets, a favourable 
exchange rate, and cheap labour. But markets are increasingly difficult, the 
peso overvalued, and labour less abundant and more expensive. There is 
urgent need for more investment to increase productivity, and a sector that 
wishes to remain internationally competitive will have to accept quality 
control.4 
The economic modernisation of the Pinochet government affected only a 
small part of the population. Average salaries were lower in 1989 than they 
were in 1970. GDP per capita had increased only at 1 % pa since 1974. One 
legacy of Pinochet's economy was a dualism between a modern export 
economy, and an underfunded, and in many ways backward, internal 
economy. Another undeniable, though negative, legacy of the Pinochet area 
is the burden of international debt. In the period 1985-88 something like 6% 
pa of Chile's GDP was used to pay debt to international banks. According to 
the Budget Director, Jose Pablo Arellano, debt repayment accounts for 10% 
of the government's budget and will continue at that level until the year 
2010.5 
The Aylwin government, on assuming power, faced a series of economic 
dilemmas of both a short and long term nature. Its immediate task was to 
stabilise, and not to continue the dizzy expansion of the 1988-89 boom. It has 
to overcome the tendency to dramatic swings from boom to bust that 
characterised the Pinochet economy. It has to repay the social cost of those 
years, but it has to do so in the context of controlled macro-economic 
equilibrium and not of populist redistribution. And not long after assuming 
power, it also had to absorb the external costs of oil price rises with the Gulf 
war. 
As the ECLA report cited earlier underlines, its achievement have been 
impressive. It stabilised successfully in 1990 without reducing the level of 
investment; indeed 1990 saw the highest rate of investment for the previous 
twenty years. It has contained inflation without sacrificing growth. There is 
little doubting the authority of the Finance Minister Foxley, and the 
coherence he has imposed on the whole economic team. The Socialist 
Minister of the Economy, Carlos Ominami, also played an important role in 
creating confidence amongst entrepreneurial sectors that the government was 
committed to preserving, and indeed expanding, a vigorous private sector . 
One striking feature of current political discussion in Chile is how little 
real debate there is about economic alternatives. Most of the economists 
whose criticisms of the Pinochet government's policies were so acute, are 
now in the government or advising it, and are hardly likely to voice public 
doubts. And the economists of the right, though they may criticise details, 
can have little complaint about the general direction of government policy. 
However, there are some areas of concern. One is that the government has 
concentrated too much on the export sector to the detriment of the internal 
sector. Exports now generate a very high proportion of GDP. It has been 
argued that there must now be a switch to developing the internal economy 
in order to maintain the high levels of economic growth, for the mismatch 
between the level of internal development and the export economy could, in 
fact, prejudice the further expansion of the export economy.7 But there is, 
for example, no real industrial policy. There is also concern that there is too 
much foreign investment in relation to domestic investment, leading to 
excessive foreign ownership of the Chilean economy. 
Perhaps the most specific criticism has been of the copper policy of the 
government. The Christian Democratic politician, Juan Hamilton, as Minister 
of Mines, was heavily criticised for failing to modernise CODELCO, and 
indeed for treating it, as did the Pinochet government, as a source of easy 
revenue for the state. He was also accused, not least by Senator Laura Soto 
of the Party for Democracy (PPD) who defeated Hamilton in the Senatorial 
contest for Valparaiso, to be using his position in the interests of his own 
party and his own electoral campaign in his attempt to win the Senatorial 
contest in 1993. A new copper law was passed in August 1992 to allow for 
private capital to form joint ventures with CODELCO, but it disappointed the 
private sector.8 The private sector, under the new law, is restricted to 
minority partnerships; CODELCO is not obliged to enter such arrangements 
nor to exploit all the mining concessions it possesses; and the present 
government is not seen as inclined to proceed very far in practice.9 There is 
union opposition to any scheme which would weaken their power and present 
manning levels. Not least, there is reported to be opposition to change from 
the military, for it earns a fixed proportion of CODELCO's foreign earnings 
- in 1991 the military received US $277 million. 
The Socialist Party has advocated a policy more open to foreign capital in 
the state copper sector, in the form of joint ventures, though a corollary of 
that would be an increase in productivity by dealing with questions of over-
manning, and also a process of decentralisation of the administrative 
structure. But the appointment by Aylwin of Alejandro Hales, Frei's former 
Minister of Mines, and a strong advocate of a powerful state presence in the 
mining sector, to the same position in his cabinet reshuffle in 1992, seems to 
indicate that the broad lines of Hamilton's policies will be continued. 
The biggest debate, however, is in the area of income distribution. Is the 
government doing enough to alleviate poverty? 
The social costs: are they being repaid? 
The economic achievements of the Pinochet government were made at a 
considerable social cost. Between 1970 and 1988 total social expenditures per 
capita fell by 8.8 %, and health alone by almost 30 %. The asignacion familiar 
(family allowance) which had played an important role in reducing social 
inequality in the past fell by more than 70% in real terms in the same period. 
Income distribution worsened considerably: the 40% of poorest homes in 
Santiago saw their share in consumption fall from 19.4% in 1969 to a mere 
12.6% in 1988. The proportion of families living in extreme poverty rose 
from 8.4% in 1969 to 14.9% in 1989; and in poverty from 20.1% to 
26.3%.10 
Income distribution has improved under the Aylwin government, and it is 
as well to remember that the government assumed office only in March 1990, 
facing an over-heated economy that needed controlling. The share of the 
wealthiest 20% in national income fell from 59.9% in 1989 to 54.7% in 
1991. At the same time the population estimated as living in poverty fell from 
40.1% in 1990 to 37.6% in 1991. There has been a rise in the minimum 
salary, yet in 1991 the level of the effective real minimum salary (i.e. the 
minimum salary minus deductions) was still 29% below that of 1978, the 
highest year of the Pinochet government. There was a huge loss between 
1981-87, which will take time to make good. The minimum salary is still low 
in absolute terms. In May 1992 it was less than half the level considered 
necessary to satisfy basic needs. Moreover 11% of the Santiago work force 
receive less than the minimum salary. 
One of the first major achievements of the Aylwin government was a tax 
reform in 1990 which collected about 2% of the GNP, allocated to increase 
social expenditures. Social spending by the Aylwin government was 21% 
higher in real terms in 1991 compared with 1989, a trend that the right-wing 
newspaper El Mercurio called la contra-revolucion silenciosa, adapting the 
theme of the economists of the Pinochet years that what they were doing was 
effecting a 'silent revolution'. Nevertheless, social spending in 1991 was still 
only 7% higher than in 1985, though unemployment was very high in that 
year and a substantial part of the labour force was directly employed by the 
government on low wage emergency employment schemes.11 As part of a 
long term strategy to create local employment, the Aylwin government has 
set up an agency to stimulate local enterprises, the Fund for Solidarity and 
Social Investment (FOSIS), and this will have a budget of US $6 million in 
1990, rising to $30 million in 1992. 
The Ay 1 win government increased the health budget by 30% in real terms 
in the first two years of office, with preference given to primary health care 
and the poorest sectors. In the 1993 budget there is a real increase of 5.3% 
in government expenditures overall, but over 7% for social costs, including 
employing another 2000 functionaries in the health sector to staff the new 
hospitals.12 But there is constant and unsatisfied demand for more rapid 
improvement in the health sector, and the Minister of Health was forced to 
resign in late 1992 following protests from the doctors. Even though 
substantial funds have gone to improve the pay of those working in the health 
sector, public sector doctors in October 1992 demanded a 100% increase in 
salaries against a 30% offer from the government. There appear to be two 
acute grievances of the doctors, and both are arguably another negative 
inheritance of the Pinochet government. In the first place, for all the vaunted 
modernisations of the Pinochet government, large sectors of central 
government were neglected and underfunded, and the health sector is still 
characterised by 'a vast amount of unnecessary paperwork, antiquated 
procedures, under-paid civil servants and demoralised professionals'.13 
And, secondly, for all the recent improvements, health sector pay trails far 
behind that of the lucrative and growing private sector. Aylwin sacrificed his 
Health Minister, Jorge Jimenez, to the doctors, and a series of face saving 
negotiations restored peace. But the central point made by the unfortunate 
Jimenez was surely correct: that the combination of a badly neglected sector 
and a sharp increase in expectations following the election of the Aylwin 
government created the ingredients for a crisis in the health service. 
Could the government have acted more rapidly to redress income 
inequalities? It is clear that there is concern at the popular level about the 
slow pace of change. In a public opinion survey amongst the poorest 
communes of Santiago, only 9.5% said that the government's performance 
was as good as they expected; 18% said that the people were 'conforme y 
apoya algobierno': 46.3 % said that the people were 'disconforme, pero igual 
apoya al gobierno'. Asked about which social group most benefitted from the 
government, 8.5% said the poor, but 67.7% said the rich. Again, 21.6% said 
that social inequalities had lessened; 50.6% that they had stayed the same; 
and 21.6% that they were worse.14 It would be unrealistic to expect any 
government inheriting the problems that faced Aylwin and his team in 1990 
to have satisfied the pent up demands of the Chilean poor. It is clear that the 
government is, above all, concerned to maintain equilibrium as the only way 
to promote both growth and distribution in the long term. 
Yet there may well be capacity to increase social expenditures more 
rapidly. Most Chileans are poor, and poorer than they were two decades ago, 
and a once relatively well organised welfare state much reduced. But social 
demands need to be organised, and another legacy of the Pinochet state is a 
drastically weakened popular movement, both at the level of trade unions and 
community associations. The parties of the left, are either, in the case of the 
Communist Party, much weakened, or, in the case of the Socialist Party, a 
central part of the government. In the absence of powerful political pressure 
from parties of the left, or from popular movements such as unions, it seems 
likely that the government will continue on its cautious path. It is interesting 
that the one major confrontation that the government has faced so far was 
organised by medical doctors, a group that, however poorly paid, is hardly 
representative of the mass of the Chilean people. 
Has the labour movement regained its past power? 
If one of the other legacies of the Pinochet regime was a seriously weakened 
labour movement, what has labour gained from the first two years of the 
Aylwin government?15 
There have been some overall gains. The proportion of the work force 
organised into unions reached 15.7%, or 700,000 workers, by the end of 
1991: an increase of 35 % over the last years of the Pinochet government. But 
the size of unions has continued to decline from an average membership of 
97 workers in 1981 to 71 in 1991, and even the percentage of workers 
covered by collective bargaining has declined from 9.9% in 1981 to 9.7% in 
1991.16 There is a particular problem in the countryside where there are 
650,000 wage workers in the countryside - but only 100,000 are permanent 
and the rest are temporary. Rural unions hardly exist. Only 10,000 peasants 
are organised into unions that can enter into real negotiations, and only 5,000 
belong to peasant cooperatives. 
There have been reforms of the labour code, but by no means a return to 
the past. There has been no restoration of compulsory membership in unions 
at the level of industrial plants, nor funding of unions through a share in 
company profits. Among the gains for labour were elimination of a clause 
that allowed dismissal without reason; an end to time limit on strikes; 
creation of an indemnification system for all levels of workers; recognition 
of smaller size unions; collective bargaining at levels above the plant, if there 
is agreement between unions and employers; non-unionised workers have to 
pay 75% of regular union dues if they benefit from negotiated collective 
agreements; and workers in temporary occupations can now engage in 
bargaining leading to agreements (convenios) if not contracts. 
But other issues were unresolved. The state is largely absent from 
involvement in collective bargaining. There is no real unemployment 
insurance system, and 40% of the workforce lack health insurance at the 
workplace. State support for training facilities is inadequate. There are 
reports of continued persecution of union leaders and activists in certain 
industries. Unions were disappointed by the government's refusal to 
intervene in the negotiations to end the strikes in the Chuquicamata copper 
mines. Yet there is hardly widespread dissatisfaction with the government. 
A survey showed that of 294 plant level leaders, 39.5% thought that the new 
labour laws favour the unions, 49.7% say they leave them in the same 
situation, and 7.5% think they have been prejudicial.17 
The number of strikes has been relatively small - more than in the 
Pinochet period but of lesser duration, and involving only some 6.6% of the 
work force - proportionately less than the strike rate in Britain or Japan. 
Most strikes have taken place in the public sector, and there were some well 
publicised ones in copper, steel, coal, public health and education. The 
motives for the strikes were pent up resentment of conditions imposed during 
the Pinochet regime, and the hope that a newly elected democratic 
government would be responsive. But relatively little was gained. The 
government was anxious that strikes in the public sector would not become 
the prelude to accelerating inflation caused by high wage increases.18 
Labour has a long way to go before it recovers its former influence. There 
are structural reasons for this which will be difficult to overcome whatever 
the policy of the government. Areas of growth in the economy are not the 
ones favourable for union development. Growth has been concentrated in the 
financial sector, which is white collar employment and poorly organised; in 
the fruit export sector with temporary labour; and in the timber industry 
where workers are geographically separated. Amongst previously powerful 
groups the port workers saw their privileged position abolished by the 
Pinochet government, and now have precarious work conditions. The copper 
miners remain strong but with salaries that tend to separate them from other 
sectors of the union movement, and they lack the support that they used to 
receive almost automatically from parties of the left. 
Chilean unions in the 1960s and 1970s organised a politically influential 
national confederation, the Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT). This has 
been revived under a slightly different name, the Central Unitaria de 
Trabajadores. Over 75% of organised workers are in the CUT, but it is far 
weaker than it was in its heyday. Yet it still retains its divisions into party 
political groups, though the leading political force is now the Christian 
Democratic Party (PDC) and not the parties of the left. As in previous 
congresses, the first CUT congress of the restored democracy, held in 1992, 
faithfully reproduced the division of the union movement along party political 
lines. In the elections for the executive the PDC obtained 45% of the votes 
and 20 seats on the 45 member executive; the Socialist Party was second with 
34% of the vote and 15 posts; the Communist Party was third with 20% of 
the vote and 9 posts; and a small left wing group took 2% of the vote and one 
post. The swing to the PDC reflects the greater weight in the CUT of the 
white collar workers, above all the school teachers. 
The CUT has not really attained some new status as the national 
spokesman of the labour movement. It is organisationally too weak to 
confront the now much more powerful business groups. It is still bedeviled 
by internal tensions resulting from the different partisan affiliations of the 
union leaders. The President of the CUT, the Christian Democrat Manuel 
Bustos was jeered at, and then attacked, by left wing unionists when he spoke 
at a CUT rally on 6 November. 
The government speaks of the need for concertacion social, or social 
pacts, but this represents to some extent an aspiration rather than a reality. 
The government was unable, for example, to secure agreement with labour 
and with employers on the labour code reform, and had to negotiate its own 
version with the parties of the right that control the Senate. Still, there have 
been regular tripartite contacts, and the Labour Minister does meet CUT 
leaders weekly, and there is regular consultation with union leaders over 
wider matters. There is, at least, an embryonic neo-corporatist system of 
consultation which did not exist in the past. The problem is that the union 
movement is still too weak to take full benefit from it. The major concern of 
the government is the support from the business sectors and not labour. 
One of the major justifications for Pinochet's reform of the Labour Code, 
and indeed of most reforms which, in his view, interfered with the operation 
of the market, was that it would replace an inefficient, interventionist state 
with an efficient, non-interventionist one. There have undoubtedly been gains 
in some areas, but was the picture really as black and white as the Pinochet 
government maintained? 
Did the Pinochet regime leave such an efficient state? 
There is a previous question, of course, which is was the pre-Pinochet state 
that inefficient anyway? The Chilean state apparatus compared favourably 
with that of other Latin American countries in certain areas, notably in those 
of health and education. If slow and often cumbersome, the system was at 
least relatively fair, and in contrast to the state sector in many other 
countries, not notably corrupt. Some state enterprises, such as CODELCO, 
the giant copper corporation, attained reasonable levels of productivity. This 
existing state apparatus helped the Pinochet regime to institutionalise itself. 
Moreover, it is important to note that reform of certain state sectors, and 
some, if limited, programmes of targeting the poorest sectors, would not 
have been possible without the state institutions and social welfare policies 
that predated the regime. The Pinochet regime's record in targeting the poor 
could not have been achieved without the pre-existing institutional structures 
of functioning municipalities and ministries, and a whole network of 
programmes in the health and education arenas.19 The emphasis of the 
Pinochet government on reducing the state did not necessarily enhance its 
efficiency. The military government was hardly constrained by the 
institutional limits that face a democratically elected government. There was 
little incentive to reform areas, such as the judicial system, where reform was 
not necessary for the overall aims of the government. 
One of the last acts of the Pinochet government was to pass a series of 
laws, known as the 'binding laws', or leyes de amarre, that would make 
public sector reform difficult for the incoming government. The motives for 
these laws included a desire to put as much as possible of the Pinochet-
moulded institutions beyond the influence of the new government, and to 
make life as difficult as possible for that new government. One law, for 
example, gave public employees legal tenure of office, making it extremely 
difficult for the Aylwin government to change most posts in the public 
sector.20 Some new programmes that are intended to produce rapid results 
and to be highly visible, such as the youth training programme and the quality 
of education programmes, have been set up as quasi-independent agencies 
precisely to avoid inefficiency in the central government structure.21 
Another area of unreformed inefficiency in the democratic system is the 
Supreme Court and the judicial system. The Supreme Court did little, if 
anything, to impede the construction of an authoritarian system, and had a 
lamentable record in the area of human rights. Pinochet ensured that the 
Supreme Court at the time of his leaving the Presidency was both 
conservative and powerful. During the last 9 months of his government 
Pinochet appointed 9 of the 17 members of the Supreme Court through 
dubious mechanisms. The nucleus of the political power of the Supreme 
Court is in the Constitutional Tribunal. On this body, which has important 
constitutional powers, three of the seven members are named by the Supreme 
Court. Two more are nominated by the National Security Council, five of the 
eight members of which are either judges or military officers. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court nominates three of the nine designated senators. The 
government is committed to reforming the judicial system, and some progress 
has been made. Though it compares well with many other Latin American 
countries, it is, nevertheless, slow, inefficient and conservative. A modern 
state needs a modern and efficient judicial system, but the judiciary is far 
from keen on accepting any criticisms of its conduct, let alone participating 
in measures of reform. Once more the Aylwin government can proceed only 
slowly and with difficulty, and with patient negotiation with the parties of the 
right. 
In theory, the Pinochet government reforms created a decentralised 
municipal government. The laws established a certain degree of financial and 
administrative independence for municipalities by allowing them to generate 
their own resources and hire additional technical staff; guaranteed certain 
fiscal transfers to the municipalities; and established a common municipal 
fund through which rich municipalities transferred funds to poorer ones. The 
municipalities were central to the military government's policies for the poor, 
such as the employment programmes. But real decentralisation never 
occurred. Authoritarian government structures were merely transmitted to the 
municipalities. Mayors were designated by the government. During 1988 a 
new law meant that the mayors of the 15 largest cities were directly appointed 
by the government till 1992, and the rest were appointed by the Community 
Development Council (CODEC), which consisted of designated members: 
half from private sector organisations and half from Juntas Vecinales and 
other neighbourhood associations.22 
The measures taken by the Pinochet government, the leyes de amarre, 
were intended to create obstacles to any attempt to reform the Constitution. 
Before Pinochet left office, he had to accept a Constitutional Reform passed 
in a plebiscite in mid-1989 which removed some of the most objectionable 
features of that constitution, slightly reduced the control of the executive over 
congress, and made further reform marginally easier. Yet the essential 
structure of the Pinochet constitution remains intact. 
What remains of the Pinochet Constitution? 
The answer, for the Government, would undoubtedly be, too much. There 
was one major change in the Constitution with the legislation to elect 
municipal governments, and to create, for the first time, regional 
governments. For the first time for 20 years, municipal governments were 
elected on 28 June 1992, and on 11 October, for the first time ever, by 
indirect election, regional governments were created. The parties of the 
governing Concertacion won 53.5% of the vote and elected 1158 councillors, 
to the 29.67% for the party alliance of the right with its 727 councillors.23 
The bulk of the government's constitutional reform proposals were 
contained in a bill sent to Congress in June 1992. The government proposal 
maintains certain features of the present constitution, not least that requiring 
a 60% majority in Congress for future reform of the constitution, and 66% 
for major institutional changes. The government wishes to stress that 
fundamental reform must be a matter of agreement involving the opposition. 
Specifically the reform packet contains the following proposals: 
a. strengthening those sections that guarantee better individual rights, 
including that of equality of the sexes. 
b. increasing the power of congress, and simplifying legislative 
procedures. 
c. improving the system of constitutional and electoral law, and 
modifying the composition of the Tribunal Constitutional, and the 
Tribunal Calificador de Elecciones to ensure greater participation of 
executive and congress in those two bodies. 
d. giving the president the power to dismiss the Commanders-in-Chief 
of the armed forces. 
There is a separate but related project to reform Congress to make it more 
representative, and the electoral system fairer. This involves the removal of 
the designated senators, an increase in the size of the senate to 54 members 
(at present there are 38 elected senators), and of the lower house to 164 (from 
120), both distributed in a way to reduce the over-representation of the rural 
areas. A Proportional Representation electoral system is proposed, but with 
a limit of 5 deputies or 6 senators per electoral district (except 8 for Santiago) 
to prevent the proliferation of small parties. There is provision for electoral 
pacts and sub-pacts to facilitate a policy of electoral and political alliances.24 
But this all depends on the agreement of the political right. The presence 
of nine designated Senators, and the over-representation of the right by the 
Pinochet electoral system blocks the government in Congress. The parties of 
the right benefit from the existing system, and will not surrender those 
benefits unless others are offered. Moreover, the right is not prepared to start 
bargaining until all the presidential candidates are nominated, the campaign 
is firmly under way, and opinion polls give some indication of the strength 
of the various candidates and party alliances. 
One of Pinochet's central political aims was to ensure that the military was 
protected from political interference, and that the military still had reserve 
political powers which could be used in case of social conflict. The transition 
was, after all, a pact between the military and the parties, and Pinochet 
ensured that his army did not surrender all the gains that they had made under 
his rule.25 
What remains of the power of the military and of Pinochet? 
Constitutional provisions are no necessary guide to the actual power of 
particular institutions. Although the Constitution gives wide power to the 
military, in practice this has been exercised sparingly. All Constitutions 
develop conventions, and those developing in Chile tend to strengthen the 
civil authorities over the military. The reasons for this development include 
the high degree of internal unity of the governing coalition, and the relative 
lack of substantive disagreement with the opposition; the economic success 
of the Aylwin government; and the undoubtedly great tactical skill with which 
the President has handled difficult issues in the relationship with the military, 
such as the question of human rights abuses. But there are still areas where 
the military acts relatively uncontrolled by civil authorities. For example, 
President Aylwin in an interview came close to admitting that the intelligence 
forces were largely out of control, though he also claimed that this state of 
affairs was universally common. The problem in Chile is that the intelligence 
community is directly controlled by the army, not by civil authorities, and the 
army is controlled by Pinochet. There is reportedly some dissatisfaction with 
Pinochet at a professional level in the army, for his intense dislike of the 
USA leads to his refusal to rely heavily on the USA for arms supplies. The 
result is that there are multiple arms suppliers and obvious logistical 
inefficiencies. But how far this is significant it is difficult to say. There is no 
doubt that Pinochet enjoys firm command over the army, and is likely to do 
so as long as he wants, especially while human rights issues surface from 
time to time.26 
Two incidents in late 1992 brought the issue of control over the 
intelligence forces to light. The first one involved the interception and taping 
of a car telephone conversation between the Senator of Renovation National, 
Sebastian Pinera and a political colleague. The tape, played in Pinera's 
presence on a TV programme, consisted of abusive comments about another 
RN politician, and possible presidential candidate of the right, Deputy Evelyn 
Matthei. The incident, which occurred in August 1992, was still in the 
limelight in December. As a result of judicial investigations an army captain 
from the telecommunications unit was placed under military arrest, and later, 
the General in charge of Santiago telecommunications unit, Ricardo 
Contreras, requested early retirement. It also emerged that the person who 
passed on the tape to the TV station was none other than the wronged Evelyn 
Matthei herself.27 
What is the significance of the incident? It shows that there is surveillance 
of political activities by military units. It was a painful proof for the right of 
the extent of internal political division, because the obvious target of those 
who arranged the leak was to destroy the presidential chances of an attractive 
progressive right wing politician. In the end it destroyed the hopes of two 
such candidates. Who would want to undermine such candidates? It is clear 
that there is a powerful group on the right whose conception of politics is 
very different from those who want to promote a right based on modern 
political parties. The 'old right' want to retain a more traditional style of 
politics in which parties play a subordinate role. Some also want to promote 
an independent candidate of the right closer to the Pinochet regime than the 
possible candidates of the progressive right. If the military was responsible 
for the technical aspects of the 'Pinera affair', it is no less clear that the 
subsequent development involved elements of the civilian right. 
Then, in September 1992, a secret service agent indicated, in a TV 
interview, the existence of an intelligence operations centre, lightly disguised 
as a vehicle repair centre, where, he alleged, cellular phone calls (that image 
of modernity in Chile) were intercepted and taped. All calls made on these 
machines - even those of the President and the Cardinal, he claimed - could 
be, and in some cases, had been recorded. The effect was explosive, for if it 
was difficult to verify the accuracy of the statement, there was indeed an 
intelligence centre where the agent indicated. 
The responses of the various actors were interesting. The army attacked 
the report for undermining the role of the military in its efforts to control 
subversion, and there are indeed still small terrorist groups operating in 
Chile. If the army adopted an offensive posture, that of the government was 
rather defensive. The government seemed more concerned not to upset the 
military than to protest against violations of privacy. The Minister of Defence 
was conveniently unable to attend a meeting of a congressional committee 
called to investigate the affair. The government did not use the affair to call 
into question the whole structure of intelligence operations in Chile. Indeed 
the strongest position taken in defence of democratic rights was that of the 
TV station involved, TV Nacional, confirming the point that a free media is 
absolutely necessary to defend democracy. 
The affair was still not concluded by the end of 1992. The army's position 
became less belligerent as the judicial inquiries revealed the extent of military 
surveillance. Indeed, in a statement of unprecedented moderation the army 
accepted that in the Pinera case the whole unit was in breach of military 
norms, and offered to cooperate with the civilian courts.28 Nonetheless, this 
could be a tactical retreat in the face of difficult circumstances: it does not 
necessarily imply a capitulation to civilian authority. What both incidents 
seem to indicate is the existence of two parallel systems of power in Chile: 
one democratic, controlling the economy and most aspects of the political 
system; but another a secretive, and sometimes not so secretive, carry-over 
from an authoritarian past, controlling intelligence, responsible to the army, 
and posing a veiled threat to the civilian authorities - in Pinochet's words, a 
sleeping lion. 
General Pinochet had wider ranging ambitions than the construction of a 
constitution that would endure simply because it was difficult to reform. He 
wanted to effect change not just in the institutions of the state, but also in the 
political culture of Chileans. There has undoubtedly been change in favour 
of giving priority to market forces over state control, and the left has 
abandoned almost all its former Marxist rhetoric and Leninist practice. But 
such changes have occurred in many other countries as well, responding to 
international changes in these two directions after the collapse of 
international communism. So it is clearly difficult to separate out the 
Pinochet effect from the international effect. 
What remains of the Pinochet political project? 
General Pinochet made no secret of his dislike for parties as a whole and 
politicians as a species, and not just those on the left. He would dearly have 
liked a totally depoliticised society in which partisan differences had no 
place. Failing that, his intention was to secure dominance for the forces of 
the right. But the distribution of electoral support between the parties has 
remained remarkably stable over the long term. In 1992 the right won 29.9% 
of the vote (Renovation National, the Union Democratica Independiente, 
plus the votes given to independent candidates of the right and two small right 
wing parties); in the 1970 presidential election the candidate of the right won 
34.9%; and the average of the congressional vote from 1937 to 1973, for the 
right, was 30.1 %. In 1992 the centre won 29.4% (the PDC plus independents 
of the centre); in 1970 the PDC presidential candidate won 27.8%; and the 
average centre vote from 1937 to 1973 was 39.7%. In 1992 the left (the 
Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and the Party for Democracy) won 
24.3 %; in 1970 the presidential candidate of the left (supported by the centre 
Radical Party) won 36.2%; and the average congressional vote from 1937 to 
1973 was 24.2%. This stability was even more notable considering that in 
1992 half the voters had never voted before. An electorate of 4.5 million in 
1973, became, in 1992, 7.8 million.29 
If the distribution of the votes altered relatively little, on the other hand the 
parties themselves changed a great deal. It is certainly true that the parties are 
much less dogmatic and sectarian than they were. The very formation and, 
even more, the duration of the multi-party Concertacion alliance is evidence 
of that. This is undoubtedly in part due to the presence of Pinochet himself. 
The very act of calling a plebiscite in 1988 in which there was only one 
choice, forced the parties together; and the continuation of Pinochet in the 
office of Commander-in-Chief of the army is another good reason for the 
alliance to continue. But one should be careful before assuming that formerly 
doctrinaire parties are now totally pragmatic. It could be argued that there is 
now a new ideology to substitute for those of the past: that of consensus.30 
Another aim of the Pinochet government was to create a political right that 
would form a natural political majority. This particular project failed in its 
maximum goal, partly because the Pinochet government had so long despised 
the political parties that it could not at the last moment resurrect the parties 
as its new form of political expression. Moreover, the electoral system 
devised to put the right in power proved unable to deflect the voting pattern 
sufficiently in favour of the right. What it did do, in addition to the 
provisions of the constitution on majorities necessary for reform, plus 
designated senators, was to ensure that the right would have an effective veto 
power. 
Confirming Pinochet's fears about political parties, even of those which 
supported him, the right was unable to maintain any degree of political unity 
and split into two separate parties. As the leader of Renovation National, 
Andres Allamand, remarked bitterly after the Pinera affair, 'si (la derecha) 
no tenemos cultura de partido, menos tenemos cultura de coalicion'.31 The 
major party of the right, RN, is itself internally divided, and a rightist 
populist Errazuriz takes a small but significant vote from those who continue 
to dislike political parties. But one of the Pinochet legacies is a powerful, 
programmatic right, with an electoral base that is the envy of other right wing 
parties in Latin America (though, to be historically accurate, it had solid 
electoral support except for unusual years such as the polarised 1964 
presidential election). 
The Pinochet government intended to tame the left with the crude and 
brutal instruments of repression and exile. The Chilean left is undoubtedly 
more moderate than in the past, but then so is the left in practically all other 
countries in the world. The one remaining more or less orthodox party of the 
left, the Communist Party obtained 5.6 % of the vote in the municipal 
elections in 1992 (compared with 18.9% in the congressional elections of 
1973), and this was less than the 8.10% for the candidates of Errazuriz, the 
Union de Centro. But it was more than expected, and seems to show that it 
is too early to write the obituary of the Chilean Communist Party. The 
Socialist Party, in part through the experience of exile in the countries of 
Western Europe, is indeed much more moderate than before 1973. A major 
achievement of the Socialist Minister of Economy, Carlos Ominami, was to 
convince entrepreneurs that they had nothing to fear from the socialists, and 
that in terms of economic modernisation and flexibility they had less to fear 
from the Socialists than they did from the PDC. The new language of 
socialism in Chile speaks about internationalisation of the economy; 
technological modernisation; restructuring the state apparatus; changing 
assistential social expenditures for productive ones.32 One of the first 
campaign platforms of Ricardo Lagos is a sharp reduction in the number of 
separate ministries from over twenty to five or six - namely, Interior, 
Foreign Affairs, Defence, Economic Development, Social Development, and 
Secretary to the Presidency. This is intended to reduce the level of 
bureaucratisation, and to aid overall coordination. It is indicative of the 
degree of consensus in Chilean politics that this is precisely what the right 
wing party Renovation National is also proposing.33 
It is, however, possible to exaggerate the degree of uniformity in the 
Socialist Party. In the elections for the Presidency of the Socialist Party in 
November 1992, a leading proponent of moderation, German Correa was 
elected with 38 % of the vote: but not that far behind was the chief spokesman 
of a more traditional socialism, Camilo Escalona with 31 % of the vote. And 
the Escalona and allied lists took 45 % of the seats on the Central Committee, 
compared to 35 % of those associated with Correa (the rest went to members 
of so far unaligned tendencies). The Escalona faction is pressing for 
representation in the running of the presidential campaign of the Socialist 
candidate Ricardo Lagos. Indicating the change of emphasis that he would 
like to see, Escalona said that, 'Creo que hay ahi una omision relativamente 
seria y un problema global, que es la relation entre el Estado y el mercado, 
que en nuestra opinion no puede seguir siendo alterada en favor del mercado 
sin poner en peligro ni mas ni menos que la estabilidad del proceso 
democratico'.34 
If the somewhat precarious unity of the Socialist Party is one dilemma, 
another one is the still remaining problem of the relations between the 
Socialist Party and the party formed to allow socialists to contest Pinochet in 
the plebiscite in 1988, the Partido por la Democracia (PPD). The PPD does 
have a constituency that is different from that of the Socialist Party, among 
people who have never been active in politics, and it attracts members from 
other social democratic parties, like the Radicals, whose future is bleak. The 
strength of the PDD also derives from the presidential candidate of the 
socialists, Ricardo Lagos, who is, however, identified with the PPD rather 
than with the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party decided in 1992 that double 
membership of both parties was not permitted, and members had to opt for 
one or the other. Nonetheless, the alliance between the two persists inspite 
of a rather imprecise overall relationship, in part because of the even balance 
of electoral support between the two parties. In the municipal elections of 
June 1992, the PS received 8.46 %, and the PPD 9.18% . If the two parties 
were to compete separately under the existing system for the congressional 
elections held at the same time as the presidential ones, then it would lose 
many of its congressional seats. 
The PDC is clearly more popular than even the PS and PPD combined. In 
the 1992 municipal elections, the PDC received 28.97% of the vote. This 
minority electoral support for the PS and the PPD presents the left with 
another dilemma: how far can they go in the presidential contest of next year, 
without imperiling the future of the Concertacion? The Socialist movement 
has to present a candidate and to compete strongly, otherwise it loses its 
sense of separate identity. But it knows it is a minority party compared with 
the PDC.35 A public opinion poll held in September 1992 showed that if 
there was a single candidate of the Concertacion, that candidate would gain 
53.3%, to 29.9% of the right, 8% for the maverick independent Errazuriz, 
and 6.6% for the left wing Movimiento Democratico de Izquierda Allendista 
(MIDA). If there were two Concertacion candidates then it would be 17.7% 
for Ricardo Lagos, 35.5% for the PDC candidate, and the same proportions 
as before for Errazuriz and the MID A candidate.36 However, Lagos is not 
that far behind in the polls, and is a strong campaigner. By contrast, the PDC 
candidate Eduardo Frei is a taciturn and rather unimpressive politician whose 
major political capital is his name - his father, Eduardo Frei, was the popular 
PDC President from 1964 to 1970. The Socialist Party is organisationally 
weaker than the PDC, but there still exists a sub-culture of socialism that 
provides a solid base for Lagos. There is also less fear of the socialists by 
other political groups. They have been relatively successful in persuading the 
larger entrepreneurs that they too share the project of economic 
modernisation - they encounter more ideological suspicion at the level of 
small and medium entrepreneurs. 
The major party of the government, the PDC, has its own internal 
problems. The choice of Eduardo Frei to be the candidate was not popular 
with some of the powerful PDC politicians who had kept the party alive 
through the dark days of the dictatorship when Frei was not politically active. 
Yet one of the peculiarities of the PDC is the way that it can combine quite 
hostile and personal disagreements with an eventual fierce loyalty. The 
Chilean left over the years has been equally able to match the PDC in the 
intensity of internal conflict, but quite unable to resolve those differences and 
present a united front at the time of elections. Moreover, the PDC enjoys the 
benefit of having being seen as the major actor in the successful Concertacion 
government, and from the fact that Aylwin, a president whose initially high 
popular standing has hardly faltered, is also a life-long and loyal Christian 
Democrat. 
One of the peculiar features of Chilean party politics at present is that 
although it is known who will be the candidates of the left and centre, the 
formal mechanisms for nominating those candidates either do not yet exist, 
or were elaborated in order to accommodate the choice that had, in a sense, 
been imposed on the party by a small elite. The right is in such a state of 
confusion that by the end of 1992 it had neither candidate nor a mechanism 
for choosing the candidate. If, as is possible, the Concertacion presents only 
one candidate, there is still no agreement on how that single candidate would 
be chosen. It is a comment on the extent to which politics in Chile is still 
elitist that the most important choice open to parties, that of candidate for the 
presidency, has in effect been made without consulting, at least formally, the 
rank and file. 
What is politics now about in Chile? 
From September 1992 onwards politics will revolve around the campaign for 
the presidential and congressional elections. Indeed so dominant is this focus 
that a criticism of the present government is that it has run out of steam. It is 
argued that while it is true that the government has achieved its first major 
objective, that of reconciliation, it has made less progress on the second 
front, that of transformation, and that there is no real strategy for the period 
which ends with the elections of 1993. One commentator has written that the 
great mystery is why the government has favoured the 'democracy of the 
pacts and agreements' instead of 'an agreement or pact for democracy', in 
which there is significant advance towards a modernisation of the political 
system.37 
There is little discussion of general political issues such as the obvious 
difficulty of combining indefinitely a strongly presidential system with 
coalition government. According to Ricardo Lagos, 'La esencia del tema es 
cual es la naturaleza de un gobierno de coalition de largo plazo en regimen 
presidencial? Como hacemos coalition de partidos distintos en un sistema 
presidencial? Y este es un desafio muy dificil!.'38 The question remains 
unresolved, though central to the future of the Concertacion. A strongly 
presidential system like that of Chile can only work if the president 
commands a majority in Congress; but given the distribution of support 
between the parties, that means that the majority must be made by a party 
coalition. A central, and as yet unresolved question is how the candidate of 
the Concertacion is to be chosen. This is more than usually important because 
the next presidential term, unless there is constitutional reform, is for eight 
years. The PDC appears to want the president to come from the majority 
party, which is, by far, the PDC itself, which implies the logic of electoral 
majorities, but at the same time resists the Socialist pressure to allow two 
candidates to compete for the presidency, arguing that this, in effect, is 
incompatible with a party coalition. The Socialists argue, not without reason, 
that the PDC is applying a different logic according to circumstances that suit 
the PDC.39 
The change of cabinet in September 1992 was not prompted by the need for 
policy changes nor the need to remove weak or unpopular ministers. It was 
caused by the need of the parties to begin the contest for the next presidency, 
and essentially by the resignation of Lagos to head the socialist campaign, of 
Ominami to run that campaign, of German Correa to seek election to the 
presidency of the Socialist Party, and of Juan Hamilton to campaign for the 
PDC for the senate seat of the Vth region. The cabinet changes symbolised 
the growing competition between and inside the parties, and may reduce the 
power of the government over the parties. 
Politics in Chile in late 1992 is about electioneering. But what are the 
issues in the election campaign? The central one is about competence: who 
can best administer the prevailing consensus, not who can change it. The 
most divisive issues seem to be in the area of morality - divorce, abortion 
and the family. These give the right a distinct profile from the Concertacion, 
and the church is also emphasising these moral issues, though in practice the 
difference between the government and opposition is hardly huge. Human 
rights is not now a central issue, though it could flare up if judicial processes 
proceed rather further than expected. General Contreras, the head of the 
former secret police agency, the DINA, and Colonel Espinoza have been 
indicted of complicity in the assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington 
in 1976, and the Supreme Court has ordered a trial into the case. The 
ramifications could be explosive, though it is also possible that the case could 
be buried under the weight of legal proceedings. 
A related issue is that of law and order. The right argues, aided by El 
Mercurio, that there has been a sharp increase in violent crimes since the 
return to democracy. It is difficult to get accurate figures. What does seem 
to the case is that crime has increased, but has been increasing since 1984 -
another of Pinochet's legacies? Two guerrilla groups, the Frente Patriotico 
Manuel Rodriquez, and Lautaro, now operate as a series of loosely connected 
local groups, which sustain themselves through robbing banks. But the scale 
of their activities, although worrying, do not constitute any real threat to the 
political order. 
There may be a change in the style of politics once the municipal councils 
move into action. They began to function only on October 11 1992, but their 
operation will lead to a rebirth of party activity at the local level, for it has 
until now been largely concentrated at the elite level. There was a burst of 
local independence when some local parties refused to accept the national 
agreements on the distribution of the post of mayor between the parties. In 
about 10% of the municipalities there was a refusal to accept the agreement 
made between PDC and Socialists to elect mayors according to an agreed 
formula. Most of the agreements were broken by the PDC, and about 30 PDC 
councillors faced disciplinary measures. The resumption of local government 
and local politics will also lead to pressures on parliamentarians to resume 
the former clientelistic and patronage roles, which could in turn put more 
pressure on the government for measures of social expenditures. 
Conclusion 
Chilean politics will be absorbed by the short term calculations of the 
candidates for the office of the presidency, and, later by those of candidates 
for Congress. There are, however, several crucial issues that will be shaped 
by the way that the campaign develops, and the way that campaigning affects 
the prevailing consensus. The first one, is the future of the Concertacion 
alliance itself. Can it survive having two candidates for the presidency? The 
Socialists argue that, in theory, it can: the PDC position is that it cannot. But 
for the Socialists to withdraw there will have to be a deal that allocates them 
a considerable influence in the next government, and that may not be to the 
liking of those in the PDC who see their party as the natural majority party. 
The issue of constitutional reform will probably wait until the next 
presidency, but then it will become more urgent, not least because there is 
strong opposition inside the Concertacidn to the next president being in office 
for eight years. But agreement to reform the constitution will still demand 
negotiations with the right: only part of the Senate is up for reelection, and 
the designated senators remain there till 1997. 
Can the next government, which will take office in March 1994, maintain 
the same degree of economic equilibrium? There is no doubt that Finance 
Minister Foxley enjoys a particular authority, not least because he is 
supported by the exceptional authority that attaches to President Aylwin. Will 
the next President have Aylwin's authority? Will the next Finance Minister 
have Foxley's power? Will pressure from the parties for more expenditure 
increase, while the government is less able to resist such pressures? It is 
unlikely that the next government will enjoy the prestige and authority of this 
one, so the real question is what difference a more 'normal' government will 
make to the structure and operation of Chilean politics. 
There is also the related question of how long will the poor wait? They 
have been very patient, but the rewards so far have not been over-whelming. 
A down-turn in the economy, an increase in party competitiveness, an 
increase in the support for anti-party candidates such as Errazuriz could lead 
to increased pressure for redistribution of a sharper kind than has been 
undertaken during the first two years of the Aylwin government. 
And finally, how long will Pinochet remain Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army? No civilian government can feel entirely at ease while he still controls 
the army, and Pinochet will never want any government to feel at ease while 
he still exercises his role as guardian of his achievement. Yet one of the 
triumphs of the Aylwin government is how, in spite of all the obstacles, it has 
created its own legitimacy. Working within a very restricted Constitution it 
has nevertheless used to the maximum the flexibility and ambiguity that any 
Constitution undoubtedly contains. If it has not quite made Pinochet's 
Constitution its own Constitution, it has nonetheless achieved remarkable 
results with the tools at hand. So much depends upon the first transitional 
government that takes over after a prolonged period of military rule. The 
Aylwin government has, by most indicators, been a success so far. It has 
shown that a civilian government can be more restrained than a military one 
without, at the same time, becoming unpopular. It has achieved a remarkable 
degree of public consensus about its aims and methods. It has gone as far as 
it was politically possible in attempting to deliver some degree of justice to 
those who suffered from human rights abuses. It has restored a deep tradition 
of constitutional rule. It has handled the military question with tact and 
courage. It has shown that civilian government can work.40 
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3, 1991. 
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27. See the report in El Mercurio, 11 November 1992. 
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a candidate for the Presidency instead of presenting himself as a pre-candidate 
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Concertacion would increase its number of lower house deputies from 71 to 
80, while the opposition would decrease from 48 to 39. The poll also shows 
that the PDC has more options than the left. If it contested the elections alone 
it would still be far and away the leading force, and it also has an option not 
open to the left, that is to say an alliance with the movement led by Errazuriz. 
If the left allies with the Communist party, it would still be in a minority 
position. El Mercurio, 6 December 1992. 
37. See the article by Jorge Heine in La Epoca, 4 September 1991. Among the 
examples of modernisation that Heine suggests are the moving of Congress 
from Valparaiso to Santiago, the direct election of mayors rather than the 
indirect choice made by councillors, and a serious reform of the state 
structure. 
38. From the interview with Raquel Correa in El Mercurio, 4 October 1992. 
39. See the interesting article by Carlos Vergara, 'Como ser candidato y no 
morir en el intento', Mensaje, no. 413, October 1992, pp. 453-5. 
40. An opinion poll published in December registered 56% of the respondents 
as being satisfied with the government. For the forthcoming elections, 60% 
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